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Two reasons are traditionally proposed for privatising utility or infrastructure companies.
First, the state is unable to finance the investment needs of the company owing to budget
constraints and, second, privatisation brings about efficiency gains through the imposition
of incentives on the owners and managers of the company. This paper is concerned with
studying the latter topic.
Incentives can take several forms. First and foremost is the threat  of bankruptcy. If a
privatised utility faces the threat of bankruptcy its owners should ensure that the company
operates efficiently to protect it from this outcome. The question of bankruptcy is linked
to  the question of  regulation. Alternative incentives also exist.  Where companies  are
quoted, the stock market may place financial disciplines on the company to ensure that it
is operated  efficiently.  Quoted and  non-quoted companies  may face similar  pressures
from the debt markets if finance is raised in this way. Finally, the owners of the company
may be in a position to exert direct influence over the management through their ability to
remove poorly performing executives.
Each  of  these types  of  incentive for  efficiency is addressed  in  this  paper.  Section  2
considers the question of bankruptcy. Section 3 considers financial market disciplines and
Section  4  considers  direct  shareholder  discipline.  Section  5  draws  out  the  major
implications of the paper and concludes.
12.  Bankruptcy
Once  a company has  been privatised, the  ultimate risk that  it faces bankruptcy.  It is
important, however, to a draw a distinction between the different forms of privatisation,
of which two are important to consider:
sale of the assets to private individuals or companies;
franchising of activities. 3
The latter form  is of particular  importance in developing countries.  This  section will
concentrate on the former approach, but will return to the question of franchising at the
end of the section.
2.1  The role of bankruptcy
For  any  normal  private  company  in  a  competitive  market,  the  incentive  for  the
management to operate the company efficiently is provided by the fact that failure to do
so will lead to bankruptcy. Infrastructure companies face a different situation since, on the
whole, they do not face a competitive product market. This means that the pressure to
operate efficiently is likely to be  weakened, depending on various factors, such as the
substitutability  of  the  product.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  most  privatisations  of
infrastructure companies are accompanied by the introduction of formal price regulation
which seeks to mimic the pressure of the competitive market place.
If infrastructure companies face the risk of bankruptcy, therefore, it is only as strong a
threat  as  the  ability of the  regulator  to  mimic the  competitive market.  This  may be
3 Here, both the franchising of the operation of existing assets and the build, operate and transfer franchises
are included. The latter are especially important in developing countries, particularly in south-east Asia.
2possible where sufficient information is available and the structure of the industry lends
itself to the establishment of a competitive counter-factual on which to base  the price
regulation. However, even in highly disaggregated markets where data is plentiful (such
as  the  UK  regional  electricity  distribution  businesses), the  regulatory  system  is  still
perceived to be imperfect at mimicking competitive prices. This was evidenced by the
need to re-open the price review less than one year after the latest five-year price cap had
been established.
Bankruptcy may, therefore, be an element of the incentive placed on the infrastructure
company,  but  this  incentive  will  be  only  as  good  as the  regulation imposed  on  the
company if there is little or no competition in the market for that company's product.
The interaction between the risk of bankruptcy and the regulatory system deserves further
attention. The way in which a company can be forced into bankruptcy differs, according
to the type of regulation. Table 2.1 considers two types of regulation and  the ways in
which regulatory intervention could cause financial distress.
Table 2.1: Regulatory regime and the cause of bankruptcy
Regime  Possible  causes  of bankruptcy
Rate  of return  Disallowal  of  investment  from  the  rate  base
RPI  - X  Unanticipated  cost  shocks
Another important element that needs to be considered is the way in which bankruptcy is
treated by the legal system in a country. Great differences can exist between countries
which  could  have an  impact  on  whether infrastructure companies  are allowed  to  go
bankrupt. Consider the information set out in Table 2.2.
3Table 2.2: Bankruptcy  laws  in various  countries
Country  Characteristics  of bankruptcy  system
US  Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection allows companies to undergo both financial and
operational restructuring so that they can continue to supply their products while a
rescue package is established.
UK  Receivership frequently leads to asset sales and the closure of companies rather
than their continuation as operating units. The rights of debt investors to recoup
their funds is seen to be paramount, although some recent evidence (for example,
Leyland DAF, Canary Wharf) may point to more emphasis being placed on
continuing the operations rather than recouping funds.
Germany  Formal bankruptcy proceedings are expensive and frequently lead to the company
being liquidated. Banks try to ensure rescue packages happen prior to the need for
formal bankruptcy.
The  ability  to  continue  a  company's  operations  within  the  period  of  bankruptcy  is
therefore  important. This  subject is returned to in the following sub-section under the
wider remit of regulation. One example of a US energy company that underwent Chapter
11 proceedings is the El Paso Electric Company. This company was forced to file for
bankruptcy in January  1992 owing to the uneconomic nature of its relationship with the
Palo  Verde  nuclear power station. 4 The Public Service Company of New Hampshire,
another  electricity utility, filed  for Chapter  11 bankruptcy in  1988, again because  of
nuclear  power-related  contracts,  and  emerged  as  a  stand-alone  company  in  1991. It
subsequently merged with Northeast Utilities in 1992.
2.2  Impact  of regulation
The discussion  in  the  sub-section above was based  on  the  notion that  infrastructure
companies face an actual threat of bankruptcy. Is this a realistic assumption? There are
4This  case is examined further in Section 4 since a hostile bid was launched for the company during its
Chapter 11 proceedings.
4several important reasons to believe that, even if this risk does exist the wider role of
regulation, over and above that of mimicking the competitive market, actually blunts this
incentive.
Several key questions need to be addressed.
*  Are infrastructure companies legally allowed to go bankrupt?
*  What is  the role of  the regulator if  a company were to  find itself  in financial
difficulty?
Each of these questions will be considered in turn.
2.2.1  Legal restraints
Are  infrastructure companies  allowed  to  go  bankrupt?  Since  the  majority  of
infrastructure  services are viewed as vital  to  the well-being  of  a  country  (for
example,  the  provision  of  fresh  water  or  electricity),  the  company  actually
providing the service may legally not be permitted to go bankrupt. This is clearly
the case in France where the state-owned utilities are covered by  a  law which
prevents them from becoming bankrupt, presumably by forcing the state to bail
them out as required. This approach, however, is unlikely to be directly applied to
private companies, since it would create an adverse incentive for the management
of the company.
It is more likely that there will be a legal restraint placed on the provision of the
service and enforced by the regulatory body. How this restraint is interpreted is
likely to differ from industry to industry. If the bankruptcy of a single company
did not call into question the ability to provide a service-since  a new provider
could be licensed and in place before any disruption of service occurred-then
bankruptcy  would  be  a  realistic  threat  to  a  company.  Certain  infrastructure
services, such as telecommunications, could be  seen to be open to this  type of
5threat. However, if  the removal of one incumbent operator and its replacement
caused problems,  in  terms of  the provision  of  an  essential  service,  then it  is
unlikely that the regulator would allow a company to go bankrupt. Even where a
fire-sale of the assets could take place, so that all that changes is the ownership of
the assets, it is possible that unacceptable disruption will occur.
The ability to replace a company depends on the existence of alternative operators.
Where a national monopoly exists, it is unlikely that replacement could be carried
out seamlessly, even if international alternative operators exist. However, where
the industry is operated by a series of companies or regional companies, it should
be  possible for a credible alternative to replace a bankrupt company. A similar
story  is  found  when  an  infrastructure company fails  to  meet  its  performance
criteria.  Unless  credible  alternative  operators  exist,  there  is  little  that  the
regulatory body can do to replace the operator. It would appear, therefore, that
only in a limited number of circumstances is it likely that a private infrastructure
company will be allowed to go bankrupt.
2.2.2  A wider remit for regulators
Linked to the discussion above of the allowed disruption of essential services is
the  fact  that  regulators  often  face  wider  remits  than  simply  mimicking  the
competitive market. This wider role can be seen in two ways:
*  creating an environment within which investment can take place;
*  protecting the security of supply for a customer.
In the Introduction, the two reasons for privatisation were discussed. The first of
these, using private funds to meet investment needs, is inextricably linked to the
role of regulation in several countries. Where privatisation has occurred to allow a
company access to the financial markets to fund investment, the regulatory body is
often expected to provide an environment in which the investors will feel secure.
6One interpretation of this is that there is a limited risk of bankruptcy. In the UK
this requirement is reflected through the fact that the regulatory bodies are legally
required to ensure that companies canfinance  theirfunctions.  Although this does
not provide a total safeguard against bankruptcy, it does ensure that the risk to the
investor is limited.
This requirement can be seen in other countries where the regulatory bodies have
allowed companies  to recover stranded costs to ensure that  the environment  is
suitably positive to allow future investment to occur. In the US this is an ongoing
debate linked to the nuclear electricity generation assets. In one case, the State of
New York was prepared to purchase an electricity company rather than see it fail
under the burden of debt created by a nuclear power station that is never going to
be operated.
The second way in which the wider remit has been seen is linked to the question
of the ease with which one provider could be replaced with another. There is also
a quality question, driven by environmental and health requirements, which means
that regulatory bodies need to follow a lenient path.
Obviously, the  health  and  environmental  question is  more important  in  some
sectors than in others. Water and sewerage provision is the most obvious sector
where the protection of the public is likely to override simple efficiency-based
considerations. In contrast, in telecommunications efficiency generally dominates
wider social goals.
2.3  Contracts and appropriation
In the introduction to  this section, the role of franchises was also discussed.  In many
ways, these allow the chance of bankruptcy to be more of a threat, since the aim is to
7return the assets or licence to the government or regulator at some point in the future. The
link between  the management  and ownership of the infrastructure assets is, therefore,
already  weakened  relative  to  that  experienced  in  the  flotation  of  an  infrastructure
company.
Franchises, or concessions, leading to the return of an asset to the authorities are common
in many developing countries and elsewhere. The form of concession (for example, build,
operate  and  transfer or build, operate, own  and transfer) will affect the link between
management and ownership, as will the length of the contract. However, when this type
of franchise exists, it would be normal for the granting authority to establish performance
criteria against which the operation of the project can be assessed. If these targets are not
met, the  authority would be able to default  the project and take  control of the assets
without making any compensation payments to the concessionaire. 5
Not only will these act as a direct incentive on the company to ensure that it operates
efficiently-even  without a formal distinct regulatory body-but  it is also likely to have
an impact on the covenants set by any debt investors. There is no point in establishing
covenants  which  are based  on targets  that  are weaker  than those  established  by the
franchising authority. This point is revisited in Section 3.3.
A similar effect can be achieved by having termination or re-opener clauses in licences.
These allow the licensing authority to break the contract if the company has failed to meet
its obligations in some way. Of course, the re-opener clause can also be used to protect
the company,  with  the licensing  authority able to  alter  the contract in  the  operator's
favour, if so desired. Even when formal contract re-openers do no exist, it is possible for
the company to force a contract renegotiation to raise the price. This has happened in
some franchise operations.
S A discussion  of how this might  work  is provided  in  An Outline  Structure  for Build Own  Operate  Schemes,
Engineering,  Water and  Waste  Directorate,  The Scottish  Office,  September  1994.
8Contract terminations do not happen only when a clause has been broken. Termination
without cause is allowed although there may be constraints on how early in a contract it
can happen-the  norm is for at least half the contract period to have expired before a no
cause termination is allowed-or  a specific period of notice has to be given, for instance,
ten years in the UK, or two to three years in France. Allowing periodic challenges to the
franchise ensures that the right incentives for efficiency always exist. A similar effect can
be achieved by fixed period contracts that are shorter than the asset life. This device is
being employed in the case of the Scottish Water franchising.
93.  Financial Market Disciplines: Internal Controls
Since the threat of bankruptcy appears to be  limited for the majority of infrastructure
companies, what other incentives can be placed on companies  to become efficient? As
discussed in the introduction, there are ways in which the financial market can be used to
achieve efficiency in the product market. These can effectively be split into external and
internal pressures.  In this  section,  the internal controls will be  examined  and,  in  the
following section, the external controls are considered.
Internal  controls  can be  split  into two  types,  incentives  and  disciplines-effectively,
carrots and sticks-that  can be applied by investors.
3.1  Remuneration and incentives
One way of providing incentives for a company to become efficient is through the design
of the remuneration package for the managers of the company. By linking an element of
the management's remuneration to the success of the company, it is possible to create an
incentive for the company to be run efficiently.
Consider the following example.6
Canadian  National  Railway  (CNR),  the  larger  of  the  two  Canadian  rail
infrastructure companies, is due to be privatised later this year. Its operating ratio
is 88%, 6% above that of the average of the seven main US rail companies-these
are considered  to be  the most  appropriate comparators. Management has  been
provided  with  an incentive to  lower  CNR's  operating ratio  to the  level  of its
competitors, since if the management fails to achieve that level of ratio by the year
6This  story was reported  in the Financial  Times,  September  1995.
102000, it will be denied some of the benefits of the share option scheme. The use of
high-powered  financial  remuneration linked  to  a  specific  performance  criteria
therefore provides a strong incentive for the company to become more efficient.
This is one example where the government has set the management incentives prior to
privatisation. It would also appear that this is an unusual situation. However, it does not
matter if the incentives are set by the authority privatising the company or the owners of
the company once it is in private hands. It also does not matter whether the company is
quoted or not, since it is possible for owners to establish performance-related bonuses
based on any number of criteria, not necessarily just on share price-as  illustrated in the
above example of CNR.
While  it is possible  for owners to  provide management with incentives, this  does not
necessarily  happen.  In both  the UK  and  US  share  options,  the  standard  'bonus'  for
executives is issued irrespective of performance. This has been the focus of much debate,
with  moves  in  the  UK  to  separate  both  the  granting of  share  options  (the  Cadbury
Committee  on  Corporate  Governance  proposed  remuneration  committees  staffed  by
independent non-executive directors) and the level of option (effectively making them
into  performance-related  bonuses,  as  suggested  by  the  Greenbury  Committee  on
Executive Remuneration). Some changes in the infrastructure sector have already been
seen.
Consider the following example.7
As of January 1st 1995, British Gas awards its executive directors bonuses in the
form of long-term share options. The amount of options accredited to a director
lies between  33.3% and  125% of base  pay, depending on several factors. The
share options are then held for three years. At the end of the three-year period the
'  The information  for this example was taken from British Gas's  1994 Report and Accounts  and a
subsequent  press  release  entitled  Long Term  Incentive  Scheme  Notional  Allocation,  16'h  October 1995.
11performance of the company is assessed and, depending on the performance, a
percentage of the share options is vested to the director. Table  3.1 sets out the
performance criteria and the amount released-two  sets of figures are shown since
the  initial proposal  was amended after institutional  shareholder representations
concerning the ease with which the targets could be met. These options are held
for a further two years before they are released to the director.
Table  3.1: British  Gas's performance-related  pay system
British Gas's ranking  1-25  30  40  50  60  61+
Options vested (%)
Initial  100  100  97  75  40  0
Amended  100  92  75  40  0  0
Note: The ranking  is based on the company's  position  in the FTSE 100-the  share price index of
the top 100 UK companies  by market  capitalisation.  The amount  of options vested is pro-rated
between  the points  shown.
However, the approach set out in this example appears to be the exception rather than the
rule.  This  is  not  restricted  to  just  the  UK  and  US.  Recent  European  infrastructure
privatisations  have  been  accompanied  by  the  introduction  of  share  options  with  no
performance-related  control.  (See,  for  example,  KPN,  the  Dutch  Postal  and
Telecommunications company privatised in  1994, where lm shares were set aside at the
flotation for the creation of an executive share-option scheme.) 8
As  mentioned  earlier, it  is not  necessary for the company  to be  floated  for  such  an
incentive scheme to be established, although other performance criteria must be employed
rather  than  the  share  price.  Railtrack, the UK  rail infrastructure company  due  to  be
privatised  in  the  coming  years  already  operates  an executive  performance-related  bonus
system  where  payments  of  up  to  40%  of the  basic  salary  can  be  made  if  the  company
achieves  pre-specified  targets-currently,  the company  only  pays bonuses  at  25%.  This
8 Information  pertaining  to this is contained  in note 37 of the company's 1994  Annual  Report.
12approach  may  be  more  usual  in  countries  where  there  is  less  of  a  history  of
entrepreneurial stock-market-based capitalism. Several factors, such as the institutional
framework and the tax regime, are bound to influence the way in which  performance
bonuses are established.
3.2  Shareholder intervention
Apart  from the carrot of incentive-based remuneration, shareholders have an ability to
discipline management because they have the power to remove executive directors. This
method of providing incentives depends to a large extent on the shareholders having the
power to monitor the management of the company and to censure effectively. Although
the shareholders are the ultimate owners of a company, their ability to co-ordinate and
exert pressure on the management is affected by several factors.
Key to the ability to both monitor and influence is the level of concentration of share
ownership. Where there is either a dominant, but not necessarily majority, shareholder or
a  small group  of significant holders,  they are more likely to be  able to  influence the
management of the company. The likelihood of such investors existing depends on two
factors:
*  the way the company was privatised;
*  the institutional environment in the country.
These are considered below.
3.2.1  Privatisation and the concentration of ownership
The way that infrastructure companies are privatised is bound to have an impact
on the existence of a major shareholder. Three basic models of privatisation exist:
13*  full  or  majority  sale,  with  an  emphasis  on  individual  investors  (UK
model);
*  flotation of a minority stake (Continental European model);
*  trade  sale of a minority stake, with  the aim of a flotation in  the future
(Latin American model). 9
The choice of model is bound to affect the likelihood of a major investor, or group
of investors,  existing. Table  3.2 provides  an example of an industry  where all
three forms of model where adopted within a single country.
Table 3.2: The Chilean electricity industry
Model  Companies  Comments
Full or majority  flotation  Enersis  All were sold in tranches,
Endesa  with  emphasis  on
Chilgener  employee  participation
Chilquinta
Minority  share  package  Colbun
Edelnor
Trade  sale  Pilmaiquen  The first three  were
EMELAT  standard  trade sales,
EMEC  while the fourth  (Emelsa)
Emelsa  was a work-force  buy-out
Source: Utility Privatisations  in Developing  Countries: Opportunities  for  Investors, OXERA,
1994.
Another interesting example of privatisation in Latin America is provided by the
Bolivian  electricity company,  ENDE.  Here,  the  Board  of  Directors  has  been
weighted towards the  strategic investor, even though  a  50:50 equity  split was
9  For example,  the two Argentinian  telecommunications  companies,  Telecom  Argentina  and Telefonica  de
Argentina,  were subject  to trade sales  of 60% of their equity  followed  two  and one years later, respectively,
by 30% public  flotations.
14enacted between the strategic investor and the public pension fund holding.10 This
should help to ensure that the strategic investor is able to exert influence over the
management of the company.
Building  a  'core'  of  long-term  major  shareholders  is  a  policy  that  has  been
adopted by some European countries as part of their privatisation process. France
employed this in its non-infrastructure privatisation in the 1990s. Spain has also
used  this  approach,  with  its  telecommunications  monopoly, Telefonica.  Here,
three Spanish banks hold a joint  9% stake and are committed to raising this to
15%. Since the banks intend to be major debt investors also, this places them in a
powerful monitoring position.
3.2.2  Institutional factors
There are a number of institutional factors which can either exacerbate or mitigate
the problem. The principal factors are:
*  the prevalence of major corporate shareholders;
*  the level of activity of institutional shareholders;
*  shareholder associations;
*  shareholder limits.
In some countries-especially  France, Germany and Japan-it  is normal for large
corporate  shareholders  to  hold  stakes  in  other  companies,  either  as  strategic
investments or as part of a cross-shareholding alliance. These stakes are often in
excess of 20%. Concentrating such a large degree of ownership with one investor
allows that investor to exercise considerable power.
10 This case is discussed in Capitalization  Monitor, 2:12, July 1995, published by  the Ministry of
Capitalization  in Bolivia.
15Where this type of shareholding is less prevalent, especially in the UK and US, the
problem of a widely spread shareholder base can be overcome by the existence of
proactive institutional shareholders. The dominant equity investor type in the UK
and US are financial institutions (for example, pension funds and open- or closed-
end investment funds). These institutions are able to exert influence because of
their size. However, traditionally, in the UK, in particular, and to some extent in
the US, financial institutions have only been concerned with the returns that they
earn, rather than the management of a company. If the returns proved less than
satisfactory,  the  institution would  prefer to  walk  away rather  than  attempt  to
reform the company.
This  situation has been changed by the emergence of proactive investors. In the
US this is typified by CalPers, the Californian State Pension authority, and in the
UK  by  Hermesl'  and  Pension  Investment  Research  Consultants  (PIRC).
Shareholder activism is not new, several cases exist in the UK and numerous ones
in the US, but it is becoming more evident.
In the UK there is little evidence of shareholder activism affecting  -infrastructure
companies  before  this  year-evidence  on  wider  activism  is  limited  and  is
discussed  in  Section 3.2.3. However, during this  year there have been serious
revolts over the issues of corporate governance and remuneration in the water,
electricity and gas industries. These revolts have not gone as far as the removal of
directors,  but  they have  caused  changes. The  remuneration  system  described
above  for  British  Gas  was  introduced  because  of  a  public  outcry  over  the
remuneration package of the company's chief executive.
Another  force for shareholder pressure that is growing, especially in  the US, is
associations of  shareholders. Although  any one  individual shareholder may be
unable to influence the company, owing to the size of their holding, a group of
" Formerly  PosTel,  the pension  fund  of the Post  Office  and telecommunications  workers.
16shareholders have more influence. These associations can either exist as general
watchdogs, or be constituted in response to a specific event.
Outside  the model  of the UK  and US,  there is  a  similar  form of  shareholder
monitoring, but it is carried out by banks on behalf of individual shareholders. In
Germany, for example, the majority of shares are 'bearer shares'  that are lodged
by individuals with banks which can then exercise the voting rights of the shares.
This  places  great  power  with  the  banks,  which,  when  linked  to  the  debt
monitoring described in Section 3.3 below, allows them to exercise considerable
influence over the company.
A final set of institutional impediments to shareholder disciplining of management
relate to shareholder controls. Many privatisations involve the establishment of
shareholder limits (normally 15% of the voting equity) above which no individual
shareholder can go. Also, stock-market rules often limit the size of an individual's
maximum holding before a takeover situation is triggered. The latter is very much
a  product of the UK  and US  model of  stock-market rule, while the former is
widely prevalent and is discussed in detail in Section 4.
3.2.3  Evidence from the UK and Germany
Having  considered  how  shareholders  may  be  able  to  influence  and  provide
incentives to  private  companies  it is  worth considering  some of  the  available
evidence. Although there is little evidence specific to infrastructure companies,
some information of a more general nature is available from sources including:
an unpublished study undertaken by OXERA of shareholder actions within
UK companies in the 1980s and early 1990s;
academic research into corporate governance and shareholder activity.
17Table 3.3 sets out the results of OXERA's study of shareholder actions in the UK.
Thirty cases were found where some form of investor or non-executive director-
led  activity  occurred.  Table  3.4  then  provides  some  information  on  the
composition of the shareholders involved with these 30 companies.
Table 3.3: Shareholder actions in the UK
Initiator of  One  Group of  Bank  Bank and  Non-executive
action  shareholder  shareholders  shareholders  directors
Number  3  12  1  9  5a
Outcome  Chairman and  Chairman  Chief  Other  Non-executive
chief  resigns  executive  directors  directors
executive  resigns  resign  appointed
resigns
Number  12c  15  3  10  2
Note: a This includes one case where a major shareholder joined with the non-executive directors in
initiating an action. b This includes cases where the roles  of chairman and chief executive were
combined. c One of these was dismissed after losing a court action brought by a shareholder. d In
two of the cases a single individual undertook both the role of Chairman and Chief Executive.
Source: 'Boardroom Battles: The Role of the Institutions', mimeo, OXERA.
Several  causes  exist  for  the  shareholders  actions  given  in  Table  3.3.  Most
important among these are:
*  sustained losses;
*  poor share price performance;
*  boardroom splits;
*  perception of unreasonable behaviour by the management.
Having  undertaken an action, the normal response was the restructuring of the
board of directors, either with the role of the chairman and chief executive being
split, or members of the board having to resign.
18Table 3.4: Evidence on shareholder action in the UK
Average total shareholding by large shareholders  23.1
in the sample companies
Lowest total shareholding by large companies  0.Oa
Highest individual shareholdings:
Pegi Malaysia Berhad  26.0
Walker family  25.8
ITF (UK)  24.3
Average number of shareholders holding 10% or  0.7
more in the sample




Note:  a This occurred  in five of  the 29  cases. A  further case  had  no  shareholder information
available because it was a private company.
Source: 'Boardroom Battles: The Role of the Institutions', mimeo, OXERA.
As can be seen from Table 3.4, the largest shareholders were still only significant
minority shareholders, with no single investor holding more than 30%, and the
average holding of all large shareholders being less than 25%. This is reinforced
by the fact that, on average, there was less than one shareholder holding more than
10% per company in the sample. Where holdings of more than 10% did exist, they
were fairly evenly split between financial institutions and other corporate entities.
Very few cases were found where individual shareholders held 10% or more of
the equity.
The  evidence  from  the  UK  suggests  that  actions  by  shareholders  are  not
uncommon. However, it must  be borne  in  mind, of course, that  this  covers  a
period of between 11 and 12 years. An important implication of this study is that
19shareholders  find  it easiest  to  coordinate  when  there  are  a  small  number  of
significant stakes in the company. An alternative, that of shareholder associations,
is likely to be as successful at instigating actions. However, these associations are
not as prevalent as major shareholders.
Similar information relating to shareholder actions is not available for any other
economies. However, there is evidence available from several academic studies
relating  to  the  influence  of  major  shareholders in  other  countries.  Table  3.5
provides information on major investors in German-quoted companies.
Table 3.5: Major German investors
Companies  with  no single  large  shareholdera  14.6
Companies  with  a major  shareholder  85.4
Where a large  shareholder  does  exist,  it is:
another  German  company  32.2
a family  group  24.0
a foreign  company  11.6
a bank  6.8
other  25.4
Note: a A large shareholder  is defined  as holding  25% or more of the equity  of a company.  This
covers  a study of 171  quoted  industrial  and commercial  companies.
Source:  Franks,  J. R. and Mayer,  C.P. (1994), 'Corporate  Control:  A Synthesis  of the International
Evidence',  August.
The fact that so many significant shareholders exist suggests that they should be in
a  position  to  monitor  the management  of  the company. Evidence  reported  in
Edwards  and Fischer  (1994) on the shareholder representatives on  supervisory
boards of Aktiengesellschaften in 1979 with more than 2,000 employees is given
in Table 3.6.
20Table 3.6: Shareholder representatives
Type of shareholder  representative  % of total shareholder  seats
Domestic non-banks  39.7
Of which:
holding more than 50% of equity  13.1
holding up to 50% of equity  8.1
holding no equity  18.5
Domestic banks  16.4
Of which:
holding more than 50% of equity  0.7
holding up to 50% of equity  0.4
holding no equity  11.3
Foreign firms  5.9
Government  13.2
Of which:
holding some equity  11.7
holding no equity  1.5
Private shareholders  5.7
Small shareholder associations  1.5
Former top executives  4.2
Consultants  13.5
Total  l  OO.la
Note: aThis  total does not sum to 100, owing to rounding errors.
Source: Edwards, J., and Fischer, K. (1994) Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany.
Table 3.6 illustrates that major shareholders or their representatives, for example,
banks, are represented on the supervisory boards of German companies,  so are
able to exert influence in a similar way to UK shareholders through non-executive
directors.
213.2.4  Summary of shareholder activism
Overall, it would appear that shareholders are able to influence management and
provide incentives to them, but such action has not been used widely in the past.
This may have been due to the problem of coordination when widely held investor
bases exist, which is, in turn, a consequence of the way in which companies were
privatised. Where there are single dominant minority holdings, these problems are
lessened.
3.3  Covenants and debt monitoring
A final source of investor pressure for efficiency is provided by the covenants attached to
debt issues by infrastructure companies. Whether the debt is raised in the Euro-, domestic
bond, bank or syndicated loan markets, there will be covenants attached. These typically
take  the  form  of  maximum  levels  for  various  financial  indicators,  such  as  gearing
(leverage) and interest cover.
If these levels are breached, then the lenders have the right to call in their bond and force
the company either into insolvency or into a costly new financing issue. One example of
an infrastructure project breaching its covenants is that of Eurotunnel, the largest single
infrastructure  investment  in  Europe.  Owing  to  cost  overruns  and  additional  safety
requirements, the covenants on the debt of £6 billion were broken. However, rather than
call in the loans and bankrupt the project-which  in theory the banks could have done-a
new  financing  package  was  agreed which  included  a  substantial  injection  of  equity
(£850m was raised through a rights issue). If the banks had called in their loans, then
either a separate refinancing package would have to have been agreed, or a buyer for the
project found. Either option would have involved substantial delays to the construction
process and, therefore, a further loss of value for the banks. This point is returned to later
in this section.
22An alternative that is becoming increasingly popular, especially for syndicated loans, is to
base  the  interest  rate  paid on  a  pre-set  scale according  to  the level  of the  financial
indicators.  These  'ratchet'  agreements  provide  the  company's  management  with
incentives, since it will face higher financing costs if the financial profile of the company
deteriorates, thus leaving less funds for shareholders and bonuses-be  they share options
or performance-based.
However, covenants are placed on debt finance to protect the investor rather than give the
company  incentives.  While  covenants  obviously  help  to  provide  incentives  since
companies do not want to see the debt being called in, this is secondary in terms of the
way in which  the incentives are established. The lenders therefore set  maxima which
ensure  the  funds  lent  are  safe-not  values  designed  to  push  a  company  towards
efficiency. Owing to their nature, infrastructure projects may be  afforded even greater
protection than other projects since, even though the debt investors could take control of
the project, the sunk nature of the investment means that such an action is unlikely to
boost the resale value. Clearly, management change may be necessary if the breaching of
the covenants was deemed to result from management inefficiency. The Canary Wharf
property development in London hit similar cost overruns to that of the Channel Tunnel,
and  was  in  breach  of  its  covenants.  However,  rather  than  allow  the  incumbent
management to continue, the banks declared the project bankrupt, ousted the incumbent
management and then refinanced the project under new management. This should act as
an incentive for the management.
It should also be borne in mind that, in cases where a franchising authority is also setting
performance criteria and targets, any covenants established by investors will need to be
more  stringent to  ensure  that  the  investors  have the opportunity  to  take  control  and
replace the management, rather than let the franchising authority appropriate the assets
with no compensation paid to the investors. (This is discussed in more detail in Section
2.3.) This should also act as an incentive on the management of the project.
234.  Financial  Market  Disciplines:  External  Controls
Since it would appear that equity investors have a limited ability to monitor and discipline
companies'  management (and especially 'protected'  utility companies), a final alternative
disciplining factor needs to be considered. This final factor is capital market competition
(ie, the takeover  market).  This  section considers  the role of the market  for corporate
control  and possible  impediments to its  operation, both  in general  and for  utilities in
particular.
4.1  The market  for corporate  control
If the product market is unable to discipline companies and direct shareholder action is
difficult, then a final incentive that may force companies to become efficient is the threat
of hostile takeover. Unless shareholders are satisfied that the company's  management is
delivering all  the possible  efficiencies, they will  be  willing to  sell  their  shares,  at a
premium, to a company which feels that it can achieve those efficiencies.
With this threat hanging over the company, it is expected that the management will strive
to achieve all the efficiencies, so ensuring that they are not unseated by a hostile takeover.
The following three subsections will investigate whether there are any impediments to the
working of the market for corporate control (both specific to infrastructure companies and
more generally) and the available evidence on hostile takeovers among utility companies.
4.2  Impediments  for infrastructure  companies
The discussion in Section 3.3 raised several factors which could limit the application of
the market for corporate control as an incentive device for the privatised infrastructure
companies. Table 4.1 sets out these impediments and lists some examples of their use.
24Table  4.1: Impediments  among  the infrastructure  companies
Measure  Impact  Examples
Trade sale  No market for corporate  Popular in developing countries
control  (for example, electricity
generation, gas transmission and
gas distribution in Argentina)
Golden or special share  Government has the ability to  Utility privatisations in the UK,
veto certain corporate decisions  Copenhagen airport, KPN (The
Netherlands)
Maximum shareholder level  No individual, or 'concert  Utility privatisations in the UK,
party' of shareholders can  Copenhagen airport
control more than 15% of the
voting equity. Control cannot,
therefore, be purchased
Government is majority  Acquisition can only be  Developing countries (for
stake-holder  achieved with the approval of  example, Telekom Malaysia),
the government  Vienna airport
Dual-class shares  Voting rights and ownership  Developing countries, strategic
restrictions can be placed on  industries (for example, TelMex,
different classes of equity  TeleDanmark)a
Note: a TelMex had three classes of equity after privatisation-AA,  A and L shares-each  giving different
voting rights and were open to different groups. For example, AA conveyed the greatest voting rights and
could only be held by Mexicans. TeleDanmark used a  separate A share as the first step to privatisation.
These were then converted into ordinary shares at a later date. One important factor behind the existence of
dual-class shares is the institutional attitude towards them. In the UK-quoted companies are discouraged
from establishing dual shares, since they are seen to affect the liquidity of the stock and also raise serious
corporate governance questions.
There are several possible infrastructure-specific impediments which may be established
during privatisation. These may inhibit the incentive pressure applied by the market for
corporate control.
254.3  General impediments
Not  only are there  specific controls on hostile takeovers, but  also  more general ones
which fall into three possible categories:
*  measures to control anti-competitive practices;
*  legal measures to protect incumbent stakeholders;
*  country-specific controls on takeovers.
These are investigated below.
4.3.1  Control of anti-competitive practices
Although the market  for corporate control is  considered to be  a driving force
behind incentives for efficiency, this is not necessarily conveyed into lower prices.
Where a company is expected to have a dominant product market position after an
acquisition, some form of anti-competitive practice review is expected. In the UK,
this is undertaken by the Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission (MMC); in Germany, by the Monopolies Commission and, at the EC
level, by the relevant directorate. Since infrastructure companies are often subject
to price regulation, this is unlikely to be seen as a major problem, although the
loss of information afforded by some types of takeover can lead to requests for
significant price-cuts.'2
12 A good example  of this is provided  in the UK by the hostile bid for Northumbrian  Water launched  by the
French  multi-utility,  Lyonnaise  des Eaux. After an MMC inquiry  into this proposed  takeover,  a significant
price-cut of between 15 and 20% was requested to compensate  the regulatory body for the loss of a
comparator,  later  dropped  to 15%  by the Departrnent  of Trade and Industry.  Effectively,  a quality-quantity
trade-off  was being  enforced  by the MMC.
26One aspect of this that requires consideration is the problem raised by the lack of
competition  in  infrastructure networks.  Takeover  activity may be  expected  to
ensure efficiency, but the lack of competition in networks may lead to the need for
structural regulation to ensure that anti-competitive practices are not undertaken
through  transfer  pricing  and  misuse  of  information.  These  structural  barriers,
which are likely to involve the need for vertical separation, act as a block on part
of the working of the market for corporate control. Many of the takeovers of UK
utility companies in the last year have contained an element of vertical integration.
4.3.2  Legal controls
Different countries have different levels of legal hurdles for hostile takeovers to
overcome if the takeover is to be allowed to continue. These legal controls cover
elements including the equal treatment of all shareholders and the provision  of
information. The range of legal barriers which exist vary from the UK, which is
relatively open 3, to the US, which is relatively closed. These sort of controls are
often  mixed with  the attitude towards the existence of  dual classes of  shares,
alternative voting rights etc.
4.3.3  Country-specific controls
Last, and possibly most importantly, is the influence of country-specific attitudes
to  hostile  takeovers.  Economies  of  the  style of  the  UK  and  US  place  great
emphasis on the market for corporate control as a means of ensuring efficiency,
while other economies view it as unnecessary. The prevalence of hostile takeovers
in countries such as Germany and Japan is very low-less  than five hostile bids
have ever been made in Germany. This  not only protects the  companies from
hostile bids from other domestic companies but also provides  a defence against
foreign  hostile  bids.  An  alternative cultural  block  is  the  existence  of  cross-
shareholdings between companies. This is standard in France, Italy and Japan, and
13 There  are few legal obstacles  to takeovers  in the UK. However,  in the US,  certain  states,  such as
Delaware,  have a range of laws  that can be used  to protect  shareholders  and  managemant.
27has been used in Belgium to concentrate the effective control of the gas, electricity
and cable industries for the government under one company, Tractebel.
4.4  Evidence on hostile takeovers of infrastructure companies
Overall, it would appear that the market for corporate control is a limited incentive for
management owing to the existence of impediments which are specific to infrastructure
and other more general impediments to the smooth operation of the market. This does not
mean, however, that hostile takeovers have not occurred or that the threat of them is not
enforcing managerial efficiency. Certain conditions need to be met before this type of
corporate activity occurs:
*  some, or all, of the impediments to takeover are removed;
- regulatory  or  competitive  pressure  forces  rationalisation  in  an  infrastructure
sector.
Examples of takeovers occurring after both these conditions have been met are explored
in this subsection.
4.4.1  Removal  of impediments
When the electricity and water industries were privatised in the UK, rather than
establish  impediments  that  would last  indefinitely  (as  is  the  case in  gas  and
telecommunications), the government set specific lives for the impediments. They
are summarised in Table 4.2.
28Table  4.2: Removal  dates for barriers  to takeover
Sector  Golden share  15% rule^
Water  December 31st 1994  December 31st 1994b
Regional electricity companies  March 31st 1995  March 31st 2000
Note: a Without the golden share, the 15% rule can be removed, provided that the required majority
vote is in favour of such a resolution. Several of the regional electricity companies (RECs) which
have removed their  15% rules as artificial barriers to takeover are viewed as  a poor defence  by
investors. The golden shares that were established were there to provide the government with a
residual  control  over the  company.  It  could  veto  certain  types  of  action  and  ensure  that  the
company continued to deliver the service that it had been established to provide. b One of the ten
water and  sewerage companies, Welsh Water,  has  an  indefinite  15% rule,  although it  can  be
removed by the shareholders.
Around the time that the impediments were removed, several takeover bids were
launched, not  all of which were  friendly 14. This phenomenon is not  limited  to
infrastructure  companies.  For  example, when  the  controls  on  the  number  of
franchises that independent television companies are allowed to hold in the UK
were being relaxed, several friendly and hostile bids were announced. Table 4.3
provides details on the hostile bids in the UK.
14 Table 4.3 details all the bids made since the removal of the controls. By December 1996 only two
independent RECs out of the 12 originally privatised existed.
29Table  4.3: Hostile  bids in the UK
Bidder  Target  Comment
Electricity
ScottishPower  Manweb  Acquisition of an English REC by the
vertically integrated Scottish company.
Southern Electric  South Western  Initial hostile bid, now friendly.
International (US)  Electricity
PowerGen  Midlands  Friendly bid. Referred to the MMC owing to
Electricity  implications of vertical integration. Allowed to
proceed but then blocked by the President of
the Board of Tradea.
National Power  Southern  Friendly bid. Referred to the MMC owing to
Electricity  implications of vertical integration. Allowed to
proceed but then blocked by the President of
the Board of Tradea.
Central and South  SEEBOARD  Friendly bid.
West Corp. (US)
General Public  Midlands  US bid made after the MMC blocked
Utilities & Cinergy  Electricity  PowerGen's earlier bid.
(US)
Southern Electric (US)  National Power  Bid aborted after the British Government
announced that it would not waive its golden
share in National Power.
Dominion Resources  East Midlands  Initially hostile bid that became friendly. No
(US)  Electricity  referral made.
Entergy (US)  London  Friendly bid. No referral made.
Electricity
CalEnergy (US)  Northern  Hostile bid. Finally turned friendly in
Electric  December 1996.
Water b
Lyonnaise des Eaux  Northumbrian  Bid referred to the MMC. Allowed to proceed
(French)  Water  provided price cuts were agreed between the
regulator and the company. A 15% cut over
several years was agreed.
Notes:
30a The President of the Board of Trade is the Minister responsible for the Department of Trade and Industry
in the UK.
b This only covers the privatised water and sewerage companies, not the smaller private water-only
companies which have seen extensive merger activity since 1989.
Table  4.3: Hostile  bids in the UK (cont.)
Bidder  Target  Comment
Severn Trent  South West  Referred to the MMC and then blocked on the
Water  grounds of the loss of information for the
regulator and its ability to undertake
comparative competition.
Wessex Water  South West  Referred to the MMC and then blocked on the
Water  grounds of the loss of information for the
regulator and its ability to undertake
comparative competition. Additionally, the
contiguous border between the companies
meant that possible real competition between
the companies would be lost.
Multi-sector
Trafalgar House  Northern  Bid lapsed when price review reopened. No
Electric  new bid made
Hanson  Eastern  Friendly bid. Company due to be demerged
Electricity  early in 1997 as part of the break-up of
Hanson. The new company will comprise US
coal mining, Eastern Electricity and UK
generation assets.
North West Water  NORWEB  Hostile bid, now friendly
Welsh Water  SWALEC  Second bid by a water company for an
electricity company.
ScottishPower  Southern Water  Another acquisition for the Scottish vertically
integrated company.
4.4.2  Competitive  or regulatory  pressure
Distinguishing between the condition explored in  Section 4.4.1  above and this
condition  is not  as clear-cut as could be expected. Some  of the above bids-
especially that of ScottishPower for Manweb-are  caused as much by the need to
exploit economies of scale and scope as they are by the fact that a company's
31management is now open to external pressures. If anything, it is likely that the
choice of REC to  bid for was a matter of political expediency and establishing
which companies were not already in discussion with potential bidders.
There are other cases where regulated companies have reacted to economic factors
by launching hostile bids in a hope to exploit economies of scale and scope. One
such example is the US rail industry. The details of a recent hostile bid are set out
in the Table 4.4, below.
Table 4.4: Hostile bid in the US rail industry
Bidder  Sector  Target  Sector  Comment
Union Pacific  Rail  Santa Fe Pacific  Rail  Unsolicited hostile bid was
made after Burlington Northern
made a friendly bid. Union
withdrew after the offer price
was raised
Source: Financial Times, various editions, January and February 1995.
Another hostile bid that was launched in the US concerned the El Paso Electric
Company, discussed in Section 2. While the company was undergoing Chapter 11
proceedings  in  1994, it agreed a friendly bid  from the  Central  & South  West
Corporation. However, the Southwestern Public Service Corporation launched a
hostile bid that eventually failed.
4.5  Conclusions
It would appear that the market for corporate control is able to exert influence over the
incentive management has to achieve efficiency, but that this influence can be weakened
by the existence of institutional barriers and barriers specific to takeover.
325.  Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations
Having  considered  the  various  ways  in  which  incentives  are  forced  on  private
infrastructure companies, this section will summarise what has been found and assess the
implications of the findings.
5.1  Available measures
There are various measures available for imposing efficiency incentives on a company's
management. These are discussed below.
5.1.1  Bankruptcy
For most companies, the threat of bankruptcy acts as the ultimate incentive to be
efficient. However, on the whole, infrastructure companies appear to be protected
from this for two reasons. First, the regulatory bodies are often expected to ensure
security of supply. This makes it difficult to  allow disruptions from bankruptcy
proceedings.  Secondly, the  need to  create a  stable environment  within  which
companies  will undertake the desired investment requires significant protection
against bankruptcy. This  leads to the likelihood of bankruptcy being limited to
specific factors, such as the disallowal of investment. These factors are dependent
on the regulatory regime that is in place.
Overall,  for bankruptcy to be a credible source of incentives, it must either  be
possible for the service to be passed to an alternative supplier quickly and with
little cost, or the regulatory framework must be such that supply can be continued
while the company undergoes restructuring (for example, Chapter I I in the US).
The  first  of  these  criteria  can be  met  by  having multiple  operators,  such  as
regional monopolies, rather than a single national monopoly.
335.1.2  Investor pressure: management incentives
Providing  the management of a company with direct incentives by linking their
remuneration to the performance of the company is an obvious source of pressure
for efficiency. It  does not appear to have been widely used in  the past,  since,
where high-powered remuneration packages exist, they traditionally took the form
of  share  options  that  were  purely linked  to  the  share  price  rather  than  other
performance measures.
This  approach does  seem to be changing and could readily be  employed in all
private infrastructure companies rather than just those that are quoted.
5.1.3  Investor pressure: direct shareholder action
Managers are not only worried about their remuneration, but also whether they
have a job.  The ability of investors to  hire and fire executive directors  should
provide them with a simple disciplining factor for inefficient managers. However,
for this to be a successful incentive, the investors need to be able to act in concert.
This  requires  either  a  significant  minority  holder  or  a  group  of  proactive
institutional shareholders-or  association of shareholders. The first is common in
some  countries  and  under  certain  models  of  privatisation-especially  when
financial markets are not sufficiently developed to handle the full flotation of a
major company. The second is becoming increasingly prevalent in the UK and the
US. This disciplining factor is therefore likely to become more important as time
progresses.
5.1.4  Investor pressure: Debt covenants
A final  way  in  which  investors  can  directly influence  the  incentives  on  the
management of a company is through the covenants attached to any debt raised to
finance the company. However, by their nature the covenants are set to provide
lenders with surety of return rather than efficient production of a service.
345.1.5  Hostile takeovers
Investors do not have to take direct action themselves as they can walk away from
a company. This has manifested itself in the development of hostile takeovers for
poorly performing companies. These are, however, a feature of UK- and US-style
markets  rather  than  all  financial  markets  and,  even  in  the  UK  and  the  US,
significant takeover defences are available. Many infrastructure companies have
been provided with defences by their governments at the time of privatisation,
especially in the form of golden shares and shareholder limits. Hostile takeovers
have therefore played only a minor role until now and that would appear to be
concentrated in the UK and US.
5.2  Evidence on efficiency
Although  there  are  several  possible  external  influences  that  can  lead  to  private
infrastructure  companies  being forced to  be  efficient,  there  are  clearly limits  on  the
impact that they can have. However, private infrastructure companies  have repeatedly
proven to be more efficient than public companies, particularly when competition has not
been introduced. Consider the evidence set out in Table 5.1 on UK efficiency.
Table 5.1: Pre- and post-privatisation annual efficiency gains in the UK (%)
Sector  Before privatisation  After privatisation
Gas  regions  3.0 [1977-82]  6.0 [1987-921
RECs  2.6 [1971-90]  3.1 [1991-93]
Note: Efficiency  is measured  on a Malmquist  Index  basis.
Sources:  Bums,  P.  and  Weyman-Jones,  T.  (1994),  The  Performance  of  the  Electricity  Distribution
Businesses-England & Wales,  1977-1993, Centre for the Study of Regulated  Industries.  Price, C. and
Weyman-Jones,  T. 'Malmquist  Indices of Productivity  Change  in the UK Gas Industry  Before and After
Privatisation',  Discussion  Paper  No. 12,  University  of Loughborough.
35The  evidence  therefore  points  to  significant changes  in  efficiency,  even  though  the
evidence on the impact of any single pressure for general incentives is limited. It would
appear  that  the  mixture  of  price  regulation  involving  yardstick  comparisons,  the
introduction of competition where possible,  performance-related pay  and the threat  of
takeover all combine to produce these efficiency gains.
5.3  Implications for the design of an infrastructure incentive scheme
This evidence suggests that the privatisation of infrastructure companies  is unlikely to
lead to any greater pressure for efficiency in the company than when it was under state
control, unless the following elements exist.
*  A credible performance-based management remuneration package.
By itself this is unlikely to lead to the efficient outcome, especially if financial elements
dominate the package.
*  Either  a  significant  minority  stakeholder  that  has  direct  influence  over  the
management of the company, or few barriers to takeover, so that external pressure
can be brought on inefficient management.
These  first  two  elements  will  help  ensure  good  financial  performance  but  will  not
necessarily lead to the most efficient allocation of resources. Also, customers may be
prone to exploitation by the operator. To ensure that this is controlled the third element is
required.
Some form of price and quality regulation, although the type that is chosen will
have an impact on the forces to which the company is exposed.
36Including regulation will protect the consumer. However, the credibility of the bankruptcy
threat  will  need to  be  enhanced. This  can be  achieved by  the fourth  element  of the
structure.
A  regulatory  system  which  is  able  to  cope  with  companies  undergoing
restructuring,  and  enable  supply of  essential  services to  continue: this  can be
achieved either  through multiple operators, fixed-term contracts, or termination
clauses in licences, which allow the public sector to retain control. However, these
can provide the operator with an incentive to act in a deliberately perverse manner
towards the provision of the service.
Unless these conditions exist, or full competition is established in the product market, it is
unlikely that the company will face enough pressure to force it to become fully efficient.
Although  it may prove difficult to establish all these criteria in developing countries, it
should  be  possible  to  put  sufficient  discipline  in  place  to  provide  companies  with
incentives to become more efficient.
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